Part Four -
Empty Chair, Empty Battlefield I

So the figure that Clausewitz suggests as the contemplative antidote to fears of death, failure, and destruction on the battlefield is -- imagery of death, failure and destruction on the battlefield. Not blindness or introjection, but nourished thought ranging fully into the very issues most feared. There is a stunning parallel here to the Gestalt Theoretical approach of examining harsh or avoided aspects of one's situation by experimentally identifying with that issue -- the "Empty Chair" and similar techniques. The individual is asked to experimentally act out or speak for the very issue that is so disturbing.

Indeed, Gestalt Theoretical writing asserts that it is the rigid refusal to admit such negative experience that has locked sufferers into a one-sided, artificial experiential posture that is no longer effective. By experimentally pretending to own, desire, and control the negative experience, the individual can build flexibility and prowess into living by embracing true aspects of themselves that had been denied, defusing the frightening power of the feared construct, and by re-establishing the capacity for willful movement along a whole experiential continuum.

Clausewitz, Gestalt Theory, and TRADOC all agree that an active, versatile, and accurate mental (verbal or other) grasp of the challenges of combat are essential to success. The fabulously dangerous realities of combat, coupled with the increasingly confusing and complex modern battlefield described in TRADOC 525-5, suggest that the demands for durable, versatile mental figures to direct and interpret battlefield experience under extreme pressure will operate at every level of the organization. The individual soldier will be expected to exercise an unprecedented degree of initiative and knowledge, and integrate action into a comprehensive operation with others. Otherwise, he or she will be beaten by one who can.

Here is where the "blind obedience" end of the continuum is not so easily dismissed. The problem of self-preservation has already been mentioned, but there is more. Clausewitz discusses this in his section on Applications (p. 60 - 69). (For the moment, I suggest imagining an individual, wholly autonomous warrior -- any action taken is utterly free, the only obedience is to himself.) According to Clausewitz, war will demand a sharp degree of blindness to impressions, a suspension of responsiveness to both real and imagined obstacles and dangers that were previously hidden. The soldier is assaulted in battle not only by the actual attacks of his adversary, but by a thousand spurious and undecipherable snags of information and doubt that were hidden during the quiet eve of battle. Forearmed with the nurtured contemplation of these disastrous possibilities, the successful warrior will be able to apply the strength of will required to proceed with his best plan, knowing as he does that such an ability is essential to success in battle.

But the most effective plan will be most susceptible to doubting. Earlier, Clausewitz says that given the "choice between the most audacious and the most careful solution ... it is the nature of war to advise the most audacious... Theory leaves it to the military leader, however, top act according to his own courage, according to his own spirit of enterprise, and his self-confidence. Make your choice, therefore, according to this inner force; but never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity." (p. 13 - 14)

Everything in the field, and in the battle itself, will seem to conspire not only against the plan, but against its wisdom. "To resist all this we must have faith in our own insight and convictions. At times this often has the appearance of stubbornness, but in reality it is that strength of mind and character which is called firmness."

So following through on that plan will be intensely difficult. Everything in the field, and in the battle itself, will seem to conspire not only against the plan, but against its wisdom. "To resist all this we must have faith in our own insight and convictions. At times this often has the appearance of stubbornness, but in reality it is that strength of mind and character which is called firmness."

All this would be true even for my imaginary individual sovereign warrior. Now add to this the reality that I am in fact discussing a cooperative effort, in which the plan at hand must be overlaid upon and carried out by a variety of individuals. Even in a "flattened," less hierarchical organization, with widely distributed authority and universal access to combat information, a clash of natural wills is bound to occur. The modern battlefield is more deadly, not less. The challenge of motivating troops to fight despite this danger is greater than ever. It would seem that the apparent value of blind obedience as a training goal for soldiers, practiced and refined with as much depth as possible, and couched in rhetoric powerful enough to reinforce the learning is _more_ attractive now, not less.

The information access expected for Force XXI warfighters multiplies the problem. Clausewitz was aware of the haunting, hampering effect of ready information regarding the difficulties and weaknesses of one's own forces, contrasted with the similarly haunting projections of success and mobility that, in the absence of direct information, one attributes to the enemy.

"But while we do not see the condition of the enemy," he writes, "our own is right before our eyes. The latter, therefore, makes a greater impression on ordinary people than the first, since sensuous impressions are stronger for such people than the language of reason." (p. 66) Force XXI soldiers will have the added burden of theater-wide information accurate down to the individual foxhole (or not -- networked electronic systems propagate *error* with as much speed as fact). And bad news, Clausewitz asserts, is more readily believed than good (On War, p.117).

How can soldiers, assaulted by information and true recognition of the danger of battle, be expected to fight nevertheless? Clausewitz' solution to the problem cuts to the heart of it. Viewed alone, it is sharply unacceptable:

"A general, who with tyrannical authority demands of his troops the most extreme exertions and the greatest privations, and an army which in the course of long wars has become hardened to such sacrifices will have a tremendous advantage over their adversaries and will reach their aim much faster in spite of all obstacles." (p.67)

Tyrannical authority, and that not in the occasional emergency, but through intentional practice, honed "in the course of long wars." Having asserted that the enemy will face a similar internal challenge, Clausewitz claims that victory will then go to the side that succeeds in this gritty ground of emotion and obedience. "With equally good plans," he writes, "what a difference of result!" (p. 67)

How can such tyranny be reconciled with healthy demands for personal autonomy, responsibility, and self-regulation described by the Gestalt viewpoint? How can such tyranny be reconciled with the demands of the modern battlefield, where draconian measures of authority may seem essential for motivating soldiers to stand or attack against brilliantly deadly opposition, but are so sluggish and unresponsive to rapidly sifting situations that make survival elusive and Victory a complex symphony?

Empty Chair, Empty Battlefield II

TRADOC 525-5, Section 2-3 b. (2) adds one more difficulty, in which the solution rests. Tomorrow's warfighters will face an Empty Battlefield, oddly similar to the "Empty Chair" technique of Gestalt Theory. Modern combat methods and equipment enable (and thus require) an increasingly deep battlefield, with fewer combatants, more lethal (accurate and destructive) weapons, and improved opportunities, techniques, and equipment for concealment. The result, as described in the pamphlet's Glossary, is "the perception that a soldier is virtually alone on the battlefield." Given the increased lethality of modern combat, and the expected rapidity of combat events, soldiers of today and tomorrow will be more challenged, not less, than the bloodied musketeers of Clausewitz' time. Facing greater danger, they have far less perception of joint effort and support, authoritarian or otherwise.

In small units, or even alone, they will stand or attack independently. As such, the resistances and mental obstacles described by Clausewitz will be dispersed as well. Not only the General will need to overcome "outward appearance of things," but each soldier. Ready awareness of personal vulnerability, and projection of the opponent's invulnerability, will be a greater problem than ever, as fully distributed to the individual soldier as any piece of combat information he can access from the battlefield information Net.

In small units, or even alone, they will stand or attack independently. As such, the resistances and mental obstacles described by Clausewitz will be dispersed as well. Not only the General will need to overcome "outward appearance of things," but each soldier.

At the same time, the rewards of courage, and Clausewitz's "audacity" will be distributed as well. In facing that Empty Battlefield, like the Empty Chair, success will depend on the degree to which the soldier has "nourished the thought" of disaster, incorporated its many possible details, and synthesized a course of action that expresses action "according to his own courage, according to his spirit of enterprise, and his self-confidence." (as above, from Clausewitz, p.13 -14)

Here then, is a paradoxical solution to the dichotomy between heroic initiative and blind obedience in the life of the warfighter. The very dangers of combat that seem to require irresistible authority met by unquestioning obedience have evolved to the point that such an intrusion into the autonomy of the individual soldier has become obsolete. The blindly obedient automaton will be shredded in battle by the autonomous, decision-making warrior, who alone can act and respond with the speed, power, and knowledge that modern warfare will demand and reward.

While this seems to contradict Clausewitz' comments regarding the practice of "tyrannical authority," a broader look at his work suggests he also understood the countervailing need to invest one's forces with a comprehensive program of emotional commitment, social and political support, and unified purpose strong enough to overcome both real and apparent obstacles. The correction to be made for modern American values is in the degree to which the traits of the successful general must now be distributed down through the ranks.

Tyrannical authority remains the final solution to the insurmountable resistances encountered in war. "Tyrannical authority" can now be reframed, without loss of meaning, as "supreme self-control." Supreme self-control exercised, with autonomy and informed initiative, by the soldier herself, within himself, to assert victorious experience regardless of the cost, regardless of the danger. The apparent polarity of Obedience versus Autonomy can be embraced in a circle of meaning, without contradiction, that closes at supreme self-control. Or more poetically -- Valor.

Clausewitz understood the importance of the warfighting characteristics of the individual soldier. Peter Paret's chapter on Clausewitz (Makers of Modern Strategy, from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age) states that his major work, On War, discusses at length the mental, emotional, and ethical ingredients necessary to the troops, as well as the officers who lead them, in a successful battle or war. Moral commitment, courage, and cheerful confidence are as important as bullets and field position, and frequently can turn the tide of battle against an otherwise superior force. Along with 18th century expectations of authority over the troops, Clausewitz also sees the priceless importance of inspiring the troops to valor, by personal example.

Napoleon knew this as well. When he was made a gift of enemy colors from the battle at Arcola, in Italy, he passed it on to a "General Lannes, writing, 'At Arcola, there was a moment when the fortune of the day was so uncertain that nothing but the utmost bravery on the part of the leaders could have saved the situation. Thereupon, bleeding from three terrible wounds, you left the field hospital, resolved to conquer or die. Again and again I saw you in the foremost ranks of the brave. You were the first ... to cross the [river] Adda. Yours must be the honor of owning and guarding this glorious flag.'" (Emile Ludwig, Napoleon, p. 104 -105)

Clausewitz and Napoleon knew full well that the degree of discipline required for victory in battle ultimately must come from within the soldier. Externally intruded demands and punishment for non-compliance may set the tone, at least for proscribing outright treason or cowardice under fire, but traits of courage and grit required for victory in war, like the traits required for vigor and joy in life (successful or not), ultimately must emerge from the individual, with power, clarity, zest, and richly explored understanding.

External command tyranny can't replace the integrated, spontaneous expression of valor from informed, motivated troops. Clausewitz, Napoleon, and TRADOC would all agree on this. A Gestalt perspective might add one more point: neither can tyranny's value, in the reality of the full range of human experience, be artificially denied. It is included in a living continuum. When the situation truly demands -- when there are "sappers at the wire" -- the willingness to experience tyranny (and the sense to respond to it) can now be seen as a rational possibility for honest self-expression for the individual/warfighter.

For such a function to be effective and successful, it must be practiced -- it must be well integrated into the actions and perceptions of the performers. As such, it cannot be an introjected, forced figure as the stereotypic view of military authority might think. Nor can such discipline be obtained through mere directive. It must be learned and incorporated in experience, if not through "the course of long wars," then through experientially rich and convincing training.

The learned exercise of fully integrated, profound obedience to combat direction, supported by internally energized willful compliance from the soldier, can now be seen in its proper perspective: The capacity to exercise rapid ("instant") obedience under the most severe conditions of combat stress is not an anachronistic contradiction to an initiative-based, laterally empowered, information-driven military doctrine. It is an essential ingredient of that very development. Rather than being a suspension (or repression) of individual autonomy, it emerges as a vitally important and powerful ingredient of autonomy and prowess.

The dichotomy remains obvious. Obedience versus autonomous control. But by contemplating the entire continuum as a holistic unit that is compatible with healthy, vigorous self-expression and regulation, the individual becomes free to solve the seeming contradiction by developing energy and skill in functioning at any point along the continuum, as needed according to the exercise of vigorous awareness of the present situation. From imposed obedience versus freedom, the soldier's question now becomes one of learning when and where to function at any point along the continuum. This is prowess, and healthy by any standard.

Closing

The ingredients of the successful warrior, and the healthy, effective individual in the Gestalt Theoretical perspective, then, are merged:

• accurate, informed expression of action in a social and physical context;
• lively, alert expression of a skillful hunger for sensory information from which vigorous and decisive action can be planned;
• intensive exploration, in imagination and experience, of the full range of possibilities of any experiential figure;
• unflagging embracing of personal responsibility for one's experience and actions, alone, or in concert with others.

In addition, Gestalt oriented thinking has been shown to offer a viable resolution to the apparent ethical dilemma presented by military life, by embracing the entire polarity of Obedience versus Autonomy (Initiative), and showing that the two poles are in fact fully compatible in a healthy, vigorous life of a successful warfighter. They merge at Valor.

There are implications for non-military living. In a healthy, vigorous military life, the inherent dangers of combat present a context that demands complete mobility along the entire continuum of autonomy and obedience. But this is merely places in high relief the same issues of ordinary life. True health and vigor are not achieved by artificially slicing off part of a continuum of experience. They can only be achieved by the development of liberty of action at any point along that continuum. In this case, true autonomy is not to be achieved by blanket ("blind") rejection of experiences of disciplined obedience, but by willful, informed, and vigorous development of prowess in obedience, initiative, and in Force XXI's holistic construct of initiative "within the intent of the commander."

Gestalt Theory provides an elegant, articulate format for examining such issues. In this particular case, it offers facility in exploring and resolving complex and apparently contradictory issues without falling into unproductive elaboration of the details of the polarity, without "resolving" the dichotomy by fiat, and without abstracting the discussion into artificialities unconnected to the realities of experience. Indeed, Gestalt Theory enables vigorous, creative delight in the power of the dilemma at hand, and the creative merging of the constructs of military obedience and heroic initiative.

References

Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Principles of War, Translated and edited by Hans W. Gratzke, Harrisburg, PA: Military Publishing Company, 1942.

Hollis, Patricia Slayden, "Task Force Eagle in Operation Joint Endeavor - Lessons Learned in Peace Enforcing," and "Peace Enforcing: Never Let Them See You Sweat," FA Journal, Volume 2, No.1, January-February 1997. (U.S. Field Artillery Association, Fort Sill, Oklahoma)

Ludwig, Emile, Napoleon, Liveright Publishing: New York?, 1926; Pocket Books: New York, 1961.

Paret, Peter, "Clausewitz," in Makers of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret, editor, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, "Force XXI Operations," 1 August 1994, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Force XXI Homepage, URL http://204.7.227.75:443/force21/tradoc525/525-5toc.html>, reached via ArmyLink, URL <http://army.mil/>

Yarmolinsky, Adam, The Military Establishment, New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

Not specifically cited in text:

Latner, Joel, The Gestalt Therapy Book, New York: The Julian Press, 1973.

Marx, Melvin H. and Hillix, William A, Systems and Theories in Psychology, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.

Perls, Frederick; Hefferline, Ralph; Goodman, Paul, Gestalt Therapy, New York: Dell Publishing, 1951.

Perls, Fritz, The Gestalt Approach & Eye Witness to Therapy, Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books, 1973.