Part Three -
Total War -- Total Relief

Moreover, combat decisions will cover a broader field than battle alone. War is no longer (and never really was) a simple matter of fighting the opposition until they quit or die. Operations Other Than War (OOTW) are expected to comprise an increasing role in American and Allied military action, as was seen in the Gulf War. OOTW consist of relief work, civil assistance, peacekeeping and the like. A "mix of war and OOTW in the same theater" is expected (TRADOC 525-5: 3-3 a.(1)(c)). Thus, commanders in the field (and their troops) will be required to shift accurately and effectively from stark violence to commanding humanitarian intervention. They will be directing devastating firepower in one moment, and food distribution in the next. Often, in the same moment.

Napoleon knew this polarity: "'Do you know,' he said early in those days [when he was a successful General, but years before his absolute power] 'what amazes me more than all else? The impotence of force to organize anything. There are only two powers in the world: the spirit and the sword. In the long run, the sword will always be conquered by the spirit.'" (Emile Ludwig, Napoleon, p. 155)

General Nash echoes this theme when he says,"... we learned that when you use land combat power in the peacekeeping or peace building role, you can't achieve an end state of long-term peace -- of stability and prosperity in the area. In general, a military element can only bring about an absence of war ... there will be no peace unless the people and leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina achieve it." (FA Journal, p. 6-7)

So success in combat (or peacekeeping) is rendered meaningless without similar success -- prowess -- in relief work and similar OOTW. A Marshall Plan, following months or years after military victory, will no longer suffice. Today's localized, swift-tempo manifestations of human conflict require immediate, even overlapping dominant maneuver in both warfighting and peacemaking.

Sequential thinking driven from above in a military hierarchy is unequal to the task. The emergence, interaction, and recession into the background of critically important human figures in war is so complex and intense that masterful exercise of holistic, sometimes paradoxical functioning will be required. Such flexibility demands skillful exercise of local, informed, creative autonomy in both combat and OOTW operations. Anything less would be too sluggish, too ignorant, and too immune to redirection.

It seems intuitively obvious that a military unit blindly carrying out orders, driven from above, without the freedom to take decisive action with initiative, could not possibly carry out a modern, flexible war or OOTW. It is rather easier to imagine such an organization grinding along, accurately following orders that no longer apply to the situation, making a horrendous mess of the situation, and believing that it is succeeding because the orders are being successfully followed.

On the Other Hand ...

But what about the other end of the obedience - initiative continuum? Is the soldier, or army, that follows orders regardless of risk obsolete? Today's battlefield is more lethal than ever. Will soldiers now be "choosing their battles," and choosing, perhaps, not to fight and die? How can smart ones be expected to do otherwise? Do discipline and obedience have a role in the exercise of initiative and delegated control in the new battlefield?

The problem is rich enough for many evaluations, all within a Gestalt perspective. In exploring a complex dichotomous field, it's crucial that the continuum - the"opposites" involved - be well understood. Is obedience the opposite of initiative? Yes and no. The obvious polarity can be transformed -- merged -- as soon as the soldier is ordered to exercise informed initiative (which TRADOC 525-5, in essence, does). Ordered to operate independently.

The modern soldier can be trained and expected to be obedient as an act of informed will, and still be "centered" on the continuum far from the dehumanizing pole of blind obedience. One can even add ethical responsibility to the mix, and thus empower the soldier to remain obedient while refusing to knowingly commit war crimes.

Obedience is the opposite of defiance. But then again, obedience to a counter-productive order can be a fully intentional act of defiance, just as over-obedience to the therapist can be used as an avoidance of therapeutic contact in psychotherapy. Defiance of an illegal or mistaken order, at the same time, can be an act of intense personal loyalty and effective functioning.

Perhaps the issue is blind versus willing or informed obedience. The modern soldier can be trained and expected to be obedient as an act of informed will, and still be "centered" on the continuum far from the dehumanizing pole of blind obedience. One can even add ethical responsibility to the mix, and thus empower the soldier to remain obedient while refusing to knowingly commit war crimes. But how will this help in a combat situation where the dilemma is not one of practical effectiveness or moral behavior, but one of ordering soldiers to apparently certain injury, death, and failure? Can anything other than unhesitating obedience, regardless of the information or lack of it available to the soldier, suffice in such a situation? No.

Clausewitz

No -- success in battle can never depend on a one-dimensional expression of individual liberty and initiative. The demands for instant response from troops, personal sacrifice for the sake of a broader objective, and the need for the uniquely human capacity to over-rule natural drives and responses are more compelling than ever in the fast-paced, chaotic modern battlefield, not less.

But such actions have always been at the heart of victory in battle. In Gestalt terms, combat success regularly requires execution of action when the most attentive information-seeking individual can be nearly certain that the result will be failure; that the figure pressing for attention, in its current background, will not support self-regulation, but rather self-destruction. Military thinkers from the heroic poets of the long past to the screen-writers of today's war films have always understood this, but I'll discuss just one.

Clausewitz was a holistic thinker, and was expressing not a sardonic irony, but a direct assertion that war is neither justifiable nor winnable unless it is a fully integrated expression the national will, coherent international policy and alliance, and the society's multilevel intent and willingness to sacrifice, from the Crown to the peasant to the bleeding soldier.

Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian officer during the Age of Napoleon. He never commanded troops in battle, but his brilliance as a tactician and framer of military philosophy was well recognized, though he was often a controversial figure. His most famous dictum - that war is merely the extension of policy (or diplomacy) by other means - is routinely misunderstood. Clausewitz was a holistic thinker, and was expressing not a sardonic irony, but a direct assertion that war is neither justifiable nor winnable unless it is a fully integrated expression the national will, coherent international policy and alliance, and the society's multilevel intent and willingness to sacrifice, from the Crown to the peasant to the bleeding soldier. Success in anything as deadly and chaotic as war is impossible without such comprehensive effort.

War is, above all, deadly. It is "an act of violence, pushed to its utmost bounds." (All references from Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War.) Elsewhere he says "Victory is purchased by blood." (both quotes from Hans W. Gatzke's introduction, p.6). He rejected militarists who thought that war could be reduced to geometric principles, or planned in such a way that victory could be neatly and safely accomplished with a minimum of bloodshed. Victory is won only by the destruction of the opponent's forces in battle (p. 6). Not by position, nor control of one territory or another, nor any other important but secondary issue.

How can soldiers expect to face this danger? What should a soldier consider in preparation for war? Should he or she not set all thoughts on Victory, and its practical steps in the given situation, allowing any other considerations to recede into the background? Given the inherent danger of combat, wouldn't any consideration of failure or defeat be paralyzing? Counterproductive? Defeatist?

A stereotypic rendition of military thinking would suggest exactly that. In order to break though the natural resistance of the soldier (or anyone) to the obvious danger figures in the field, only a pure and powerful "gung ho" mind set would be effective. Blot out accurate figures of need for self-preservation with introjected figures of obedience, superiority, and irresistible force.

Gestalt Theory would suggest that such a plan would be dishonest, unhealthy, and ultimately weakening. Regardless of any proposed justification based on the demands of war, vigorous and healthy functioning would never result from unquestioning, unexamined introjection of externally prepared and false figures of experience. Even if some combat practicality justified such a plan, the act of artificially blinding the soldier to the accurate perception of deadly risk, and perhaps certain destruction, could never be seen as good for the soldier. At best, such forced introjection would be a calculated sacrifice pragmatically demanded from the soldier, justified by the requirements of war, where "victory [survival] is purchased by blood."

But I have portrayed here a straw figure. Introjected, false figures of victory, safety, superiority, or irresistible force have nothing to do with effective military thinking, from the individual soldier, to the Pentagon, to the nation as a whole. In fact, they are important ingredients of defeat.

Clausewitz said as much:

We should think very frequently of the most dangerous of these situations and familiarize ourselves with it. Only thus shall we reach heroic decisions based on reason, which no critic can shake... We should always try, in time of war, to have the probability of victory on our side. But this is not always possible. Often we must act against this probability, should there be nothing better to do. Were we to despair here, we should abandon the use of reason just when it becomes most necessary, when everything seems to be conspiring against us.

Therefore, even when the likelihood of success is against us, we must not think of our undertaking as unreasonable or impossible; for it is always reasonable, if we do not know of anything better to do, and if we make the best use of the few means at our disposal.

We must never lack the calmness and firmness, which are so hard to preserve in time of war. Without them the most brilliant qualities of mind are wasted. We must therefore familiarize ourselves with the thought of an honorable defeat. We must always nourish this thought within ourselves, and we must get completely used to it. Be convinced, Most Gracious Master [the Prussian Crown Prince] that without this firm resolution no great results can be achieved in the most successful war, let alone in the most unsuccessful." (p. 12 - 13)